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 The costs of employment
protection
India has some of the more restrictive labour laws in the world.
However, these laws cover only the organised sector. Thus,
firms thinking of growing in size and becoming formal must
weigh the advantages of size against the disadvantages of
regulation. This keeps Indian firms small and informal unless
they have a lot to lose by staying small, that is, when they are
very good indeed. This, it is argued, results in a
disproportionately large share of smaller, less productive firms,
many of which operate in the informal sector, which employs
nearly 90% of the Indian workforce. This makes sense given the
uneven protection of employment across formal and informal
sectors, with the latter being virtually unregulated. Strict labour
laws may also result in very few large firms concentrating most
of the total market production, as these regulations act as a
barrier to becoming large.
Labour laws and firm productivity
How large are the effects of such laws? In a recent paper, we
provide some idea of these costs in terms of their impact on
productivity (Dougherty, Frisancho, and Krishna, forthcoming).
We use state-level variation in labour market reform and firm-
level data on the performance of industrial establishments in
recent years to tease out the effects of such reforms. Using
plant-level data between the late 1990s and the late 2000s, we
find evidence of the impact of reforms of employment
protection legislation (EPL) and related labour market policies
on plant-level productivity in India. To measure the effect of
EPL reforms we basically compare industries with high and low
levels of labour usage, across states with different degrees of
labour reforms. The fundamental assumption is that EPL is
more likely to restrict firms operating in industries with higher
labour requirements. Thus, we should see important
productivity losses in labour-intensive industries located in
states with fewer reforms relative to these same industries
operating in states with greater degree of EPL flexibility. On the
other hand, industries that rely less on labour should suffer less
from inflexible EPL so we should not observe important
productivity gaps among them across states with different levels
of EPL reform.
A key strength of our work is that the labour reform measure
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) 2007) covers 50 specific subjects of possible reform in
seven major areas of labour regulation in addition to the
Industrial Disputes Act IDA1, taking into account both formal
and informal amendments at the state level2. An additional
strength is the use of plant-level information from the Annual
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strength is the use of plant-level information from the Annual
Survey of Industries (ASI) to evaluate the direct effect of EPL in
India. We take advantage of the ASI panel data to obtain plant-
level measures of multi-factor productivity; that is, the amount
of total output that is not explained by labour, capital, and
intermediate inputs3.
We find that the modest easing of regulations in Indian states
that has taken place in recent years was enough for firms in
states with higher levels of pro-employer reform to benefit
substantially through gains in productivity. Our analysis
indicates that, on average, plants in labour-intensive industries
and in states that have transited towards more flexible labour
markets, such as Uttar Pradesh or Gujarat, are 25.4% more
productive than their counterparts in states that have
experienced lower levels of EPL reform (West Bengal or
Chattisgarh, for example). However, no important differences
are identified among plants in industries with low labour
intensity when comparing states with high and low levels of
EPL reform.
We also find that the different strategies used by plants to
overcome the constraints imposed by labour regulations
generate varied effects of state-level labour reform both by plant
size and type of ownership. Given the extensive use of contract
labour in large plants, which is a way around labour
regulations, and voluntary retirement schemes among public
plants, which is another way of relaxing restrictions on firing,
smaller plants and private plants could accrue the largest
productivity gains from state-level labour reforms.
Accelerating labour reforms
Our analysis shows that state-level actions have already led the
way in labour reform, both on paper and in practice.
Nevertheless, these reforms could be taken much further. Out
of the 20 states surveyed, only three had conducted more than
half of the potential procedural or administrative changes they
were surveyed about, suggesting that there is still much room to
ease the burden of labour regulations at the state-level. Given
the difficulty in carrying out reforms at the central level, states
may be in a better position to accelerate their own labour
reform processes while prioritising reforms according to the
characteristics of their home industries. However, the central
government urgently needs to resolve ambiguities in the
Supreme Court’s ruling and provide clear general guidelines,
particularly in areas such as contract labour and fixed-term
contracts.
Until recently, labour reform had taken a backseat in
discussions of structural reforms in India. However, recent
contract labour cases have split the Supreme Court’s bench and
have forced the issue of labour market deregulation back into
the policy debate. In addition, the government has expressed a
newfound desire to “seiz[e] the demographic dividend”
increasing chances that labour law reform will be back on the
reform agenda.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the
authors and do not reflect those of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Inter-
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Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), nor their member countries
or partners.
 
Notes:
1. The IDA came into force in 1947. Its objective is to enable the
investigation and settlement of industrial disputes by negotiation.
It extends to the whole country but applies only to the organised
sector.
2. Most previous studies for India have relied on the Besley-Burgess
(2004) index, which captures state-level reforms to the IDA
between 1949 and 1992. Besley and Burgess (2004) and several
other studies relying on their index find similar results: pro-
worker regulation has a negative impact on output, investment,
employment, and productivity among registered manufacturing
firms. However, their index deems unsuitable to evaluate the
effects of EPL on industrial performance after 1992 since most
recent changes in state-level practices have resulted from judicial
interpretations of the laws by the Supreme Court. See Dougherty
et al. (forthcoming) for more details.
3. Multi-factor productivity is obtained as a residual once all the
other inputs are netted out of total output. See Dougherty et al.
(forthcoming) for more details on the methodology we follow to
estimate these residuals.
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